We study the "house allocation" problem in which n agents are assigned n objects, one for each agent, when the agents have interdependent values. We show that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible, and the only mechanism that is group ex post incentive compatible is constant across states. By contrast, we demonstrate that a Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism exists in the two agent house-allocation problem, given sufficient congruence of preferences and the standard single crossing property.
Introduction
Many real life allocation problems involve assigning indivisible objects to individuals without using monetary transfer. Examples include university housing allocation, office assignment, and student placement in public schools. A typical goal in such a problem is to assign the objects efficiently while eliciting true preferences of the participants. The literature on matching and market design has made considerable advances on this problem under the assumption that agents have private values, namely that participants know the values of the objects being assigned. Given the private-value assumption, studies in this literature have identified a number of mechanisms that implement a Pareto efficient allocation in a strategy-proof fashion, making it a dominant strategy for each participant to reveal his preferences truthfully.
1 These and related studies have helped the redesign of school choice programs in cities such as Boston and New York City.
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In many resource allocation problems, however, the information about the objects being allocated is dispersed among participants, and each agent is often unable to assess their values based solely on his or her limited information. School choice is a case in point.
Students and parents participating in a school choice program typically have some information but find it insufficient to form clear preferences on different schools. They consult school websites, information booths, fairs and campus tours. But they also seek advice from others through word-of-mouth, online social networks, and guidebooks, and often get swayed by the anecdotes and personal experiences they are told. 1 Examples of mechanisms with these features include serial dictatorships (Svensson, 1999; Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998) , top trading cycles mechanisms (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) , hierarchical exchanges (Papai, 2000) , and trading cycles mechanisms (Pycia andÜnver, 2009) . 2 See Abdulkadiroglu, , and who helped design student placement mechanisms in New York City and Boston. 3 For instance, high school applicants "constantly talk about which colleges each high school sends its graduates to, where there might be more interesting students, how long the subway ride would be." (see "Even an Expert's Resolve Is Tested by the City's High School Admissions Process," New York Times, December 8, 2008) . The importance of the information (or lack thereof) about schools also appears to be behind the immense popularity of websites such as GreatSchools.org, RateMyProfessors.com, and
Insideschools.org. The first two websites enjoy more than 800,000 and 13,000,000 ratings and reviews on schools and college professors by students and their parents, respectively. There several influential guide books, such as New York City's Best Public Schools series, written by Clara Hemphill, which is "regarded
The scenario described here departs starkly from the private-value setting portrayed by most existing studies in matching and market design. 4 Instead, dispersed information and the relevance of local information and others' personal experiences make parents' preferences interdependent.
5 That is, a parent's information affects the preferences of other parents. Interdependence of preferences is also present in other allocation problems, such as student housing assignments, course allocation, after-school program assignment, and others. How should one design allocation mechanisms in such an environment? How does preference interdependence affect the performance of allocation mechanisms?
One important consideration in designing allocation mechanisms is the robustness of incentives. It has been long recognized in the mechanism design literature (Wilson, 1987; Bergemann and Morris, 2005) and reinforced by recent market design experiences (Abdulkadiroglu, that robust incentives, such as strategy-proofness in the private-value setting, ensure that participants are not harmed by reporting their preferences truthfully, irrespective of their beliefs about other players.
Unfortunately, preference interdependence makes strategy-proofness virtually impossible to attain. A natural adaptation of the strategy-proofness concept is ex post incentive compatibility, which requires that truth-telling form mutual best responses for every signal profile. Much like strategy-proofness, ex-post incentive compatibility makes it safe for participants to report signals truthfully, by making truth-telling a best response irrespective of the information of other agents or beliefs about it.
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as the bible for navigating school choices," according to the aforementioned article. 4 In private-values models, parents have clear preferences about their choices but are concerned about how to "play" the application game. For many parents, a more difficult problem is to determine what school is good for their child. To see how differently a parent in this latter scenario would behave relative to the one in the former scenario, suppose in a Boston mechanism, a parent receives a word-of-mouth information suggesting that many other parents view a given school as desirable. According to the viewpoint from the existing theory (first scenario), the parent will more likely respond to that information by avoiding ranking that school at the top of her list. But the parent in the latter scenario may more likely rank it at the top, realizing that the school is actually good. 5 The term"interdependence" refers to informational externalities, namely, that one's value of an object depends on the private information held by others. Importantly, it does not include allocative externalities -namely, that one's preference depends on the other agents' assignments, as would be the case with peer effects. 6 Given its appeal, the concept of ex post incentive compatibility is used extensively in mechanism design.
See Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) , Cremer and McLean (1985) , Esö and Maskin (2002) , Krishna (2003) ,
Our main finding is that such robustness comes with a high price. We show that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible whenever nontrivial preference interdependence exists (and the preference domain is sufficiently rich).
Further, if we require the mechanism to be ex post "group" incentive compatible-namely that there be no group of agents who can benefit from joint manipulations-, we find that only a trivial allocation that prescribes a constant outcome across states can be implemented. These negative results hold even when the value interdependence is arbitrarily small so the preferences are nearly private, which stands in stark contrast to efficiency obtained in "pure" private value models.
Finally, we show that weakening the ex post requirements can lead to more desirable allocations. More specifically, in a setting with two agents and two objects, a Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism exists if the standard single crossing property holds and agents' preferences are sufficiently congruent. Our analysis suggests that it may be important to pay attention to mechanisms that violate ex post incentive compatibility but satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility in order to achieve societal goals if interdependence of valuations exists. This is in a sharp contrast to private-values setting, in which various studies in recent matching and market design literature have emphasized the importance of strategy-proofness (see Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth (2009) for instance).
Related Literature
Our findings intersect with several strands of existing research. First, the central theme of our paper agrees with Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel et al. (2006) who investigate the difficulties associated with interdependent values under the transferable utility setup.
Specifically, the former paper establishes generic impossibility of implementing the efficient allocation in Bayesian equilibrium; and the latter proves the generic impossibility of implementing an allocation that varies nontrivially with states in ex post equilibrium. While our results reinforce and complement these papers, there are several important distinctions.
First, the inefficiency result of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) implementation) may at first glance appear to imply ours (established in ex post implementation, which is a stronger requirement), but the efficiency requirements are different between the two models. Specifically, they employ utilitarian efficiency as the welfare criterion, whereas we focus on Pareto efficiency. 7 The latter is much weaker, and there are often many Pareto efficient allocations. Hence, to show the impossibility of efficiency, one must show that all such allocations are unattainable. Second, unlike the public decision problem Jehiel et al. (2006) consider, 8 our triviality result is derived in the private-object setting. 9 In the private-object setting, each agent is indifferent across a number of allocations as long as her own assignment is identical. As shown by Bikhchandani (2006) , this fact can be exploited to provide non-trivial mechanisms in the private-object setting (with monetary transfers available). Finally, the results of both Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) and Jehiel et al. (2006) require that agents have multi-dimensional signals while ours do not. Due to these distinctions, our impossibility results are not implied by these papers, but rather extend their insights to a non-transferable utility environment.
Our model is also related to Chakraborty, Citanna and Ostrovsky (2010) and Chakraborty and Citanna (2011) , who study preference interdependence in a matching context. Their setup deals with two-sided matching in which agents on one side are matched with agents on the other side, whereas agents are assigned objects in our setup. This difference entails crucial distinctions both in terms of the problems studied and the main thrust of the analysis. For instance, the primary concern in their paper is stability of matching between the two sides, whereas our primary focus is on the efficiency of allocations. 10 Unlike two-sided matching, in the object allocation setting, stability is not a big concern whereas efficiency 7 The reason for the difference is the environments that these two papers focus on. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) consider a transferable utility environment in which Pareto efficiency boils down to utilitarian efficiency. Utilitarian efficiency is not implied by Pareto efficiency, however, in our non-transferable utility environment.
8 By contrast, the impossibility of efficiency continues to hold in the private object setting (see Example 14 of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) ). We thank Benny Moldovanu for informing us of this result. 9 Li, Rosen and Suen (2001) also consider a problem with interdependent valuations without transfer.
However, they consider a public decision problem while we consider a private-object allocation problem.
Their results and ours are independent of each other. 10 While Chakraborty and Citanna (2011) also consider efficiency, two-sidedness of matching makes their notion quite distinct from ours. They assume the agents on one side have common preferences of the agents on the other side, so every non-wasteful (full) matching is Pareto efficient.
is a compelling issue.
Finally, the current study is part of a growing research field of matching and market design. Gale and Shapley (1962) formalized the two-sided matching problem, and Roth (1984) stimulated early applications of matching theory to economic problems. In particular, market design for student placement due to Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) has been extensively studied in recent years. As mentioned above, the main difference of the current paper from this line of studies is our attention to interdependent values. The field is too large to summarize here. Instead, we refer to surveys of the literature by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) , Roth (2002 ), Sönmez andÜnver (2009 ), and Pathak (2011 .
Illustrative Example
We illustrate the main insight for our impossibility results in a simple setup in which two agents, 1 and 2, are assigned two objects, a and b, one for each agent. There is no money in this economy. Let v The function u i for each agent i = 1, 2 is increasing in both signals and satisfies the single crossing property:
that is, one's signal affects his own value more than the other's.
Let S o 1 o 2 denote the set of signal profiles such that agent 1 prefers object o 1 ∈ {a, b} and agent 2 prefers object o 2 ∈ {a, b}, strictly for at least one agent. 11 A Pareto efficient allocation must assign a to 1 and b to 2 when the signal profile is in S ab (because 1 likes a more than b, and 2 likes b more than a in S ab ), and likewise must assign a to 2 and b to 1 when the signal profile is in S ba . Assume that both of these sets are nonempty.
These sets are depicted as shaded areas, respectively, in Figure 1 . (In this figure, agent i's indifference curve depicts the locus of signal profiles that make her indifferent between the two objects; i.e., the set {s ∈ [0, 1] 2 |u i (s) = 0}.) Note that Pareto efficiency does not uniquely determine the assignment when both agents prefer a to b (i.e., when the signal profile is in S aa ) or when both agents prefer b to a (i.e., when the signal profile is in S bb ), or when both of them are indifferent.
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We first show that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible.
13 To see this, suppose otherwise. Then, by the revelation principle, there is a direct mechanism that is ex post incentive compatible and Pareto efficient. Then, at
A ) ∈ S ab , agent 1 must receive a and agent 2 must receive b, and reporting the signal truthfully is a mutual best response. Now consider state B = (s 1 B , s 2 A ). Note that B differs from A only in agent 1's signal, and further that agent 1's (ordinal) preference remains unchanged. These two facts mean that, for the mechanism to be ex post 12 Hence, there are infinitely many Pareto efficient allocations. By contrast, the utilitarian efficient allocation is uniquely pinned down (e.g., it is utilitarian efficient to assign agents 1 and 2 objects a and b, respectively, below the dashed curve, and the other way around above the curve).
13 As will be seen, the notion of ex post incentive compatibility must be defined more precisely for the ordinal preference/non-transferable utility environment. A few alternative concepts will be considered in the paper, but the distinction in the notions does not matter here since there are only two objects. ). State C differs from state B only in agent 2's signal, and that agent's preference is the same between B and C. This means that the allocation must be the same at these two states. To see this, suppose for contradiction that agent 2 receives a with positive probability at C (and b with the remaining probability, as required by Pareto efficiency). Then agent 2 has incentives to misreport her signal at state B, reporting s Recalling the series of equivalences, we conclude that the allocation at E must be the same as the one at state A -that is, agent 1 receives a and agent 2 receives b.
14 But this allocation is not Pareto efficient since E ∈ S ba , showing that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible.
In fact, the above argument implies much more than merely the impossibility of ex post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We can show that any ex post incentive compatible mechanism (that assigns both objects) can only implement a trivial allocation that is constant across all states! To see this, take two states arbitrarily, say s andŝ = s. Several remarks are worth making. First, the latter "triviality" result-that the ex post incentive compatibility means that only a constant allocation can be implemented-is reminiscent of Jehiel et al. (2006) , who arrive at the same conclusion under the transferable 14 Our argument may be reminiscent of studies of local incentive compatibilities by Carroll (2012) and Sato (2010) . They consider sufficient conditions under which local incentive constraints are equivalent to incentive constraints. Our analysis similarly considers a series of (small) signal changes to obtain a conclusion about global behavior of a mechanism. However, these models have private values while ours has interdependent values. Moreover, the questions they are analyzing are distinct from ours.
utility setup. Despite the resemblance, however, the current result is not implied by theirs.
One reason is that their result requires that agents have multi-dimensional signals while ours does not. In fact, the absence of monetary transfers is needed for our result. If monetary transfers were available in our example, a Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible mechanism exists, despite the fact that Pareto efficiency would entail a stronger allocative requirement in the presence of monetary transfer.
This can be seen as follows. Note first that, given transferable utilities, Pareto efficiency implies utilitarian efficiency, which requires that agents 1 and 2 receive a and b, respectively, if u 1 (s) > u 2 (s) (which corresponds to the region below the dashed curve in Figure 1 ) and b and a, respectively, if u 1 (s) < u 2 (s) (the region above the dashed curve in Figure 1 ). To see how this outcome can be implemented in an ex post incentive compatible mechanism, let
2 from the agents and assigns the objects in a utilitarian-efficient manner, while charging agent i a tariff
whenever she receives a. It then follows that agent i prefers a to b at any signal profile in which she receives a and that she prefers b to a at any signal profile in which she receives b, so truthful reporting is ex post incentive compatible.
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Second, the particular assumptions made above -convexity of S o 1 o 2 , the single crossing property, and the assumption that there are only two agents and two objects -are not needed for the impossibility of implementing the efficient allocation above. Section 4 will 15 The detailed argument for incentive compatibility is similar to that in Maskin (1992) and as follows.
By the single crossing property and the definitions of σ 1 and
Hence, she (weakly) prefers a to b, so she will have incentives to report her signal truthfully. Suppose
Hence, the agent again has incentives to report her signal truthfully. The argument is symmetric for agent 2.
establish inefficiency in a general setting in which these assumptions are relaxed. By contrast, the second impossibility result above (i.e. the impossibility of implementing nontrivial allocations) does not generalize straightforwardly beyond the two-agents twoobjects case. To see this, suppose that there are three agents, 1, 2, and 3, and three objects, a, b, and c. A mechanism that always assigns object c to agent 3, but assigns a and b between agents 1 and 2 in a way that varies only with agent 3's signal, is clearly ex post incentive compatible. This example points to another difference of the current model from Jehiel et al. (2006) . Unlike their public decision problem, agents are indifferent across some allocations in our setting; for instance, agent 3 is indifferent on how a and b are allocated between 1 and 2. This indifference can be exploited to implement a nontrivial allocation in ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. In Subsection 4.3, we provide a generalization of the second impossibility result by strengthening the incentive requirement to ex post group incentive compatibility.
Third, the impossibility results without monetary transfers rest crucially on ex post incentive compatibility. Interdependence of preferences does not preclude efficiency if one relaxes the equilibrium notion to Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Perhaps surprisingly, it is possible to implement a Pareto efficient allocation, even without transfers, via a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, when the agents' preferences are sufficiently congruent.
We will present this Bayesian possibility result in Section 5.
Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms

Setup
Suppose there are n agents and n objects. Let N and O denote the set of agents and objects, respectively. A (pure) assignment is a one-to-one mapping µ from N to O, where µ i = a means that agent i is assigned object a under assignment µ. Let M be the set of all assignments. A random assignment is a probability distribution over pure assignments.
A random assignment P ∈ ∆(M) 16 assigns agent i ∈ N to object a ∈ O with probability
16 Given set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X.
where 1 {µ i =a} is the indicator function (whose value is one if µ i = a and zero otherwise).
Each agent i receives a private signal s i ∈ S i . We denote a profile of signals by s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) ∈ S ≡ i∈N S i . We assume that S i is a convex subset of R An assignment µ is Pareto efficient at preference profile π if there exists no assignment
with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ N . A mechanism is a mapping ϕ : S → ∆(M) from a vector s ∈ S of signals to a random assignment. A mechanism ϕ is Pareto efficient if, for all s ∈ S, every (pure) assignment in the support of ϕ(s) is Pareto efficient at π(s) = (π i (s)) i∈N . In other words, we focus on "ex post" Pareto efficiency, although we will omit "ex post" since we do not consider any other efficiency notion in this paper.
We now introduce incentive compatibility concepts we shall use. To begin, we say that a random assignment P first-order stochastically dominates another random assignment
for all a ∈ O. If all these inequalities hold and at least one of them holds strictly, then we say that P strictly first order stochastically dominatesP at π i . We then say that a mechanism ϕ is weakly ex post incentive compatible if there exist no agent i, signal concept has the additional benefit of being robust to the specific assumptions about agents' attitudes toward risk or uncertainty. One could alternatively define ex post incentive compatibility based on expected utilities. This alternative concept is weaker than our notion of ex post incentive compatibility but stronger than weak ex post incentive compatibility.
Note that all these concepts coincide if one restricts attention to deterministic mechanisms as is often done in mechanism design, for instance Jehiel et al. (2006) .
Inefficiency in Weak Ex Post Implementation
We now present our first impossibility result. To do so, we introduce a few assumptions on the signal space. The first assumption is central to our study: it formalizes the requirement that there be at least some interdependence in agents' valuations.
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This assumption requires that agent j's signal influences agent i's relative preferences between any pair of objects, at least when agent i is indifferent between these two objects.
This condition captures the notion of interdependence. It is worth noting that the condition does not require the value interdependence to be large. As will be seen from Example 1, the condition may hold even with very little interdependence (i.e., almost private values). 18 Here,
with Euclidean norm z j = 1 at a given signal profile s ∈ S. To be concrete, Figure 1 , the interdependence is satisfied as long as agent 1's indifference curve has no vertical segment and agent 2's indifference curve has no horizontal segment.
The next assumption means that the signal space is sufficiently rich. To state the condition, fix any pair of agents i and j, two objects a and b, and signal profile s −ij ∈ S −ij .
Then, for k, k ∈ {a, b}, we define S ij kk (s −ij ) ⊂ S i × S j to be the (open) set of i and j's signal profiles for which (i) agent i ranks k strictly above o ∈ {a, b}\{k}, and o strictly above any k / ∈ {a, b}, (ii) agent j ranks k strictly above o ∈ {a, b}\{k }, and o strictly above any k / ∈ {a, b}, (iii) all other agents rank both a and b strictly below any k / ∈ {a, b} (we suppress the dependence of S ij kk (s −ij ) on the set of objects {a, b} to simplify notation).
Assumption 2 (Rich Domain). There exist i, j ∈ N , a, b ∈ O, and s −ij ∈ S −ij such that
As suggested by the name, the Rich Domain assumption postulates that the signal structure is rich enough to generate various preference profiles. Specifically, it means that one should be able to find two agents, a signal profile for all other agents, and two objects a and b such that the two prefer a and b to the other objects, the other agents find them the two least preferred, and the two agents find either a or b to be the most preferred depending on their signals.
In order to state the next assumption, fix the two agents i and j, two objects a and b, and signal profile s −ij ∈ S −ij as before. For k ∈ {a, b}, let hold but (i) is replaced by a weaker property: (i') agent i ranks a and b strictly above any k / ∈ {a, b}.
Assumption 3 (Connectedness). For some i, j ∈ N , a, b ∈ O, and s −ij ∈ S −ij satisfying the Rich Domain assumption (Assumption 2), and for some k ∈ {a, b}, both S We are now ready to present our first impossibility theorem (all proofs are in the Appendix A).
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions of Interdependence, Rich Domain, and Connectedness, there exists no mechanism ϕ that is both Pareto efficient and weakly ex post incentive compatible.
The key assumption used for the theorem is Rich Domain. Clearly, this assumption is easier to satisfy when each agent's signal is multidimensional, but multidimensionality of individual signals is not needed for the assumption. In fact, the Rich Domain assumption is satisfied even in fairly natural models with single dimensional signals. This point is illustrated in the following example, which one can see as a natural extension of the twoagent example described in the earlier Section 3.
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Example 1 (Canonical one-dimensional signal model). Assume that each agent i has signal s i ∈ [0, 1]. The set of objects is given by O = {o 1 , ..., o n }. Given signal profile
, 1). Assume that β k−1 − β k = δ for some δ > 0 and ∆ k := α k − α k−1 is positive and strictly decreasing in k for k = 2, ..., n. We assume in addition that ∆ n γ > δ > ∆ 2 (1 − γ). 23 The first (resp. second) inequality, combined with the previous assumptions, implies that if s i is sufficiently close to 1 (resp. 0), then agent i prefers o n the most (resp. least) and o n−1 the second most (resp. second least) irrespective 22 While the utility functions are linear in the example, the linearity assumption is made only for convenience. Our assumptions of Interdependence, Rich Domain, and Connectedness can be seen to hold with nonlinear utility functions which possess the same qualitative features as the linear utility functions described here. 23 Since ∆ 2 > ∆ n , this assumption requires γ to be sufficiently large. One could think of this as a strengthening of the single crossing property. As long as this assumption is satisfied, we can allow for asymmetric value functions with α k , β k , and γ differing across agents.
of the others' signals. 24 This is illustrated in Figure 2 below for the case of 3 agents and 3 objects. As can be seen in the figure, for Let a = o n and b = o n−1 , and fix each s k , k = i, j, to be sufficiently close to zero so that a and b are the two least preferred objects for agent k = i, j, irrespective of i and j's signals. Now, one can find a signal profile (ŝ i ,ŝ j ) ∈ (0, 1) 2 for agents i and j such that
which means that given the signal profileŝ = (ŝ i ,ŝ j , s −ij ), both agents i and j are indifferent between a and b. 25 It is easy to check that this condition also implies that both i and j prefer a and b to all other objects. Then, the Rich Domain assumption is satisfied with small ε > 0
Further, the Connectedness assumption is satisfied since the linearity of v
, each of which is a set defined by finitely many linear inequalities, are
24 To see this, we can obtain v
j =i s j n−1 )−δ and note that this expression is positive (resp. negative) for all k and s −i if ∆ n γ > δ and s i 1 (resp. ∆ 2 (1 − γ) < δ and s i 0 
It is easy to see that this tie is broken by a slight change in any agent's signal since
∂s j > 0, ∀i, j. In particular, the required interdependence (1 − γ) > 0 can be arbitrarily small, in which case the agents' preferences become almost private.
Remark 2. As stated in Remark 1, our (ordinal) notion of weak ex post incentive compatibility is weaker than the cardinal notion of ex post incentive compatibility based on expected utilities. Hence, our inefficiency result continues to hold when one employs the latter concept of incentive compatibility.
Limits of Ex Post Group Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we consider joint manipulations by multiple agents, and a mechanism that is robust against such manipulations in the ex post sense. Formally, we say that a mechanism ϕ is manipulable by group N ⊂ N at s ∈ S if there exists a signal profileŝ N ∈ i∈N S i such that, for all i ∈ N , ϕ(s N , s −N ) does not strictly first-order stochastically dominate
ϕ is said to be ex post group incentive compatible if it is not manipulable by any group N ⊂ N at any s ∈ S. This concept is a strengthening of ex post incentive compatibility, requiring that the mechanism eliminates profitable misreporting of signals not only by an individual agent, but also by a group of agents. We will show that this strengthening of incentive compatibility leads to an even stronger impossibility result, namely that only a constant allocation can be implemented.
To begin, we say that a mechanism ϕ is trivial if ϕ(s) = ϕ(ŝ) for all s,ŝ ∈ S such that π(s) and π(ŝ) are strict preference profiles. Our result is that any ex post group incentive compatible mechanism must be trivial. To obtain this result, we shall invoke again the Interdependence assumption (Assumption 1), and two variants of Assumptions 2 and 3:
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Assumption 4 (Rich Domain*). For any preference profile π, there exists a signal profile s ∈ int(S) such that π(s) = π.
The Rich Domain* assumption requires that, given any preference profile, there is an interior signal that induces it.
Assumption 5 (Connectedness*). For any strict preference profile π, the set S π := {s ∈ S|π(s) = π} is connected.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Interdependence, Rich Domain*, and Connectedness*, if ϕ is ex post group incentive compatible, then ϕ is trivial.
To see why group incentive compatibility is needed for this result, recall the example in Section 3 with three agents, 1, 2, and 3, and three objects, a, b, and c. Consider a mechanism that always assigns object c to agent 3, but assigns a and b between agents 1 and 2 in a way that varies only with the signal of agent 3. Such a mechanism is ex post incentive compatible, but it is not ex post group incentive compatible since either 1 or 2 will stand to gain from a joint manipulation with agent 3.
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While ex post group incentive compatibility is a strong requirement, the triviality result is not expected from the traditional private value model. Observe that when the values are private, our notion of ex post group incentive compatibility reduces to group strategy-proofness (see Papai (2000) and Pycia andÜnver (2009) for instance). This latter requirement is met by a large class of mechanisms that attain efficiency in the private value setting (Pycia andÜnver, 2009) . In this regard, the triviality result of Theorem 2 is striking, particularly since it holds even when the preferences are "almost" private.
To obtain the intuition of the proof, let s andŝ be signal profiles at which preferences of all agents are strict. We construct a connected path of states, s 0 → s 1 → .... → s m , such that s 0 = s, s m =ŝ, preferences of all agents are strict at each of these states, and
• any adjacent states s k and s k+1 differ in the signal of only one agent, say j k , and
• the ordinal preferences remain unchanged between s k and s k+1 for all agents except for at most one agent, say i k , who is different from j k . Between two adjacent states s k and s k+1 , the assignment for agent j k (whose signal varies across those states) cannot change due to ex post incentive compatibility (since her ordinal preferences are strict and remain unchanged per our construction). Ex post group incentive compatibility then implies that the assignments for every other agent whose preferences do not change should remain unchanged as well, because otherwise the agent whose assignment changes can profitably manipulate jointly with j k . It then follows that the assignment for i k (whose strict preferences vary across the states as described above) must also remain unchanged, since the assignments for all other agents remain unchanged (recall that there exists at most only one agent, i k , whose preferences vary, by our construction). Thus the entire assignments remain unchanged between s k and s k+1 for each k, and hence between s andŝ, which implies the result. The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
Assumptions 1, 4, and 5 enable us to construct a connected path of states with the above desired properties. However, the result can also be obtained even in other cases without these assumptions if such a path can be constructed, as our proof method can be applied to such cases. To see this, recall the canonical one-dimensional signal model in Example 1. The preference specification of this example does not admit a full set of ordinal preferences, so it does not satisfy Rich Domain*. 28 Yet, it can be shown that there exists a connected path required for the proof of the theorem.
Proposition 1. Any ex post group incentive compatible mechanism is trivial in the Canonical one-dimensional signal model in Example 1.
Remark 3. The "non-wastefulness" feature of the house allocation model -that all objects are assigned -plays a role in the constancy result of Theorem 2. Without this assumption, it is ex post group incentive compatible, for instance, to assign agent 1 his most preferred object (which varies across signals) and assign all other agents "no" objects; the agents would then have no incentive to lie about signals individually or jointly. In this sense, Theorem 2 can be rephrased as establishing "constancy" among non-wasteful mechanisms.
As can be inferred from the example, though, there is a sense in which the extent of implementable "variation" in allocation is limited even in a wasteful mechanism. If one restricts attention to a deterministic mechanism (one that implements a deterministic allocation for each profile of signals), then only one agent's allocation can change between any two signal profiles.
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Remark 4. Ex post group incentive compatibility is a strong requirement. However, a closer look at the proof reveals that the full force of this condition is not needed for the result.
More specifically, the only requirement we need is that no individual or pair of agents can benefit from misreporting their preferences. In other words, precluding manipulations by groups of arbitrary sizes is not needed. To see this point, simply observe that the proof, as outlined above, applies the condition for only individuals and pairs.
Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
In this section, we relax the incentive requirement by considering mechanisms that support truthful reporting as Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We show that the weakening of the incentive requirement enables us to achieve Pareto efficiency via a relatively simple mechanism, under some intuitive condition. telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism ϕ -namely, for each agent, reporting his true signal maximizes the expected utility, given that the other also reports his true signal.
In Figure 3 , we reproduce the same indifference curves as in Figure 1 , in which the two agents' indifference curves have a unique intersection. 31 Let (s 1 ,s 2 ) denote that intersec-29 Roughly speaking, if allocations vary for two agents (call them "inside" agents), even only as a function of the signals of the other agents (call them "outside" agents), there is a scope for the outside agents to jointly manipulate with one of the inside agents to improve his assignment, when both inside agents prefer the same object. 30 Without this assumption, it is impossible to achieve Pareto efficiency even when transfers are allowed, as shown by Maskin (1992) . to coincide withs 1 . For the same reason, another well-known mechanism, random serial dictatorship, in which one agent is chosen at random to pick the preferred object, is inefficient unless the agents are symmetric. This will be seen shortly.
We propose an alternative mechanism, denoted ϕ * , whose assignment probabilities are described in the right panel of Figure 3 . The first number in the parenthesis represents the probability that agent 1 receives a, and the second number represents the probability that agent 2 receives a. Clearly, this mechanism is Pareto efficient since agent 1 gets a (resp. b) in the area S ab (resp. S ba ). we begin by introducing a conept that plays a central role. We say that the two agents' threshold types' preferences are congruent in expectation if either
In words, the threshold types' preferences are congruent in expectation if their preferred objects, as evaluated by their expected payoffs, are distinct. In other words, the agents' preferences, in expectation, are not in conflict. With this concept in hand, we are now ready to present our first result about a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
Theorem 3. There exists a pair p, p ∈ [0, 1] that makes ϕ * Bayesian incentive compatible, if and only if the threshold types' preferences are congruent in expectation.
In fact, the mechanism ϕ * can be implemented by modifying the serial dictatorship in the following way. Each agent reports (simultaneously) whether she prefers a or b. If the agents indicate they prefer different objects, they are assigned their preferred objects. If both agents indicate they prefer a, then agent 1 is chosen with probability p and agent 2 is chosen with the remaining probability to claim a. If both indicate they prefer b, then agent 1 is chosen with probability 1 − p and agent 2 is chosen with the remaining probability to claim b. 32 With the probabilities p and p given in Theorem 3, each agent i will indicate a to be the preferred object if and only if s i ≥s i , provided that the other agent j does the same. Clearly, this equilibrium strategy will result in the same assignment probabilities as in the right panel of Figure 3 . Note that this mechanism becomes equivalent to the random serial dictatorship if and only if p = p = 1/2, which occurs only in nongeneric symmetric cases.
This result, together with Theorems 1 and 2, suggests that the two incentive requirements entail dramatic differences in what can be implemented at least for two agent cases.
While efficient allocations can be implemented by a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, only a trivial constant allocation can be implemented if one insists upon ex post incentive compatibility. The difference remains relevant even in an "almost private value" model. For instance, consider a two-agent model in which u i (s) = γs i + (1 − γ)s −i − 0.5, for γ ∈ (1/2, 1) and s i is drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. Then, the congruence assumption in the statement of Theorem 3 is satisfied regardless of γ ∈ (1/2, 1), so an efficient assignment is Bayesian implementable. As γ goes to 1, the model approaches a pure private value model;
yet the impossibility results under ex post implementation remain valid for all such γ < 1.
By contrast, with private values (i.e. γ = 1), the efficient assignment is dominant strategy (and hence ex post) implementable so the added incentive requirement does not entail any efficiency loss.
Although the necessity of this condition for efficiency is unclear for general Bayesian mechanisms, we can at least show that the condition is also necessary when we restrict attention to ex-post monotonic mechanisms: that is, for each i = 1, 2 and for all s j , Remark 5. Theorem 3 can be generalized to the case in which signals are (weakly) positively correlated. To be concrete, the same result can be proven with the assumption that, for each i and j = i, the conditional cdf
The sufficient conditions in the statement are unchanged, except for replacing each cumulative distribution function F i (s i ) in the inequalities to a conditional cdf at the threshold type, F i (s i |s j ).
Conclusion
We have studied the implication of providing robust incentives in the matching of indivisible objects to agents with interdependent preferences. In contrast to the private value setting where efficiency can be achieved via a strategy-proof mechanism, we have found that a similar robustness requirement in interdependent preferences -namely ex post incentive compatibility -severely restricts implementable outcomes. Pareto efficiency is shown to be impossible to achieve, and only a constant allocation can be attained if one also requires ex post group incentive compatibility.
Our impossibility results differ from many other negative findings in the matching literature both in terms of its robustness and the methodology. First, the impossibility is robust to the degree of preference interdependence; even a vanishing amount of interdependence is sufficient for our results. Second, our methodology for showing these results is distinct from many matching papers that often obtain impossibility in small market examples or with the small market examples "embedded" in any given (possibly larger) markets. Such a simple embedding technique does not work in our interdependence setting because every agent's signal affects preferences of everyone else. Thus even the proof of Theorem 1 needs a careful construction. Moreover, Theorem 2 means that assignments are constant across all generic signals, which cannot be reduced to an analysis on a small subset of the market.
In this sense, both of our impossibility results are quite different in nature from existing impossibility results in the matching literature.
Meanwhile, relaxing the robustness requirement raises some hope, as we have shown that Pareto efficiency can be achieved via a Bayesian mechanism in the 2 × 2 case. The basic idea is to exploit the fact that there are many Pareto efficient allocations, including random allocations. Such richness of Pareto efficiency offers a sufficient degree of freedom in randomization to generate the right incentives. In essence, the random allocation serves a role akin to "divisible" currency that is utilized to fine-tune incentives in the standard mechanism design problem (with money). We expect this idea to apply to the general n×n case. In other words, we may exploit the non-uniqueness of Pareto efficient allocations, by searching for mechanisms that randomize over Pareto efficient allocations whenever they are not unique. As n ≥ 3 gets large, however, the problem becomes complicated, since the number of threshold types increases exponentially and the degree of freedom for selecting randomizations becomes increasingly rich. We leave this extension for future research.
Appendix A: Proofs
In the proof of Theorem 1, we will invoke the following mathematical result.
Lemma 1 (Proposition 2.10, Stewart (1999)). Suppose X is an open and connected subset of a (multi-dimensional) Euclidean space. Then X is "step-connected" in the following sense: For any x, x ∈ X, there exists a sequence x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m in X such that
2. x k x k+1 ⊂ X, ∀k = 0, . . . , m − 1 with x 0 = x and x m = x , where x k x k+1 denotes the line segment connecting x k and x k+1 (including the end points).
The set (or path)
m−1 k=0 x k x k+1 in the above Lemma will be referred to as a step-wise path between x and x . 
To see this, use the Rich Domain assumption to choose any r ij = (r i , r j ) ∈ S ij aa (s −ij ) and By the Interdependence assumption and relation (4), there exists z j ∈ R m j such that . We then prove the following claim:
Proof. Note first that the following is true: For each k = + 1, . . . , m − 1, by items 2 and 3 above and ex post weak incentive com-
. In either case, this and the Pareto efficiency of ϕ imply
, s −ij ) for h = i, j, which, combined with item 1 above, gives us the desired result. Now, to establish the desired contradiction, we consider two cases:
34 We write P j = a for a degenerate random assignment such that P j a = 1. 35 This is because, by Lemma 1, we can take the sequence in such a way that s k and s k+1 differ only in one dimension, and hence in one agent's signal. 
Case (i): Let ∆s
With small enough ε, we also have (
the weak ex-post incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency of ϕ imply
, s −ij ) = a by the Pareto efficiency of ϕ. Given this and (5), agent j withs j would prefer (mis)reporting s j +1 to obtain a rather than b when others' type profile is (s i + εz i , s −ij ) .
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider two signal profiles s,ŝ ∈ S such that π(s) and π(ŝ) are strict. We will assume s,ŝ ∈ int(S) and show ϕ(s) = ϕ(ŝ). Later we will extend our argument to signals on the boundary.
Consider a sequence of strict preference profiles π 0 , π 1 , . . . , π m and a sequence of nonstrict preference profilesπ 0 ,π 1 , . . . ,π m−1 36 such that 
By the Rich Domain* assumption, there exists a sequence of signal profiles s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s m−1 ∈ int(S) such that π(s k ) =π k for each k. Take a sequence of agents j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j m−1 such that j k = i k for each k (such agents exist because |N | ≥ 2). By the Interdependence assumption and the fact that s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s m−1 ∈ int(S), there exist signals (s
Proof. First note, by construction, that π j k (s
k and this preference is strict. These facts as well as (group) ex post incentive compatibility of ϕ imply that
for each a ∈ O (otherwise, group ex post incentive compatibility of ϕ is violated at either (s
To show ϕ(s
for some j ∈ N . By equality (6), j = j k . If inequality (7) holds for i k , then, by equality (6) and the assumption that each of the n objects are assigned to exactly one of the n agents, there is another agent j = i k for whom inequality (7) holds. Thus we can assume j = i k , j k without loss of generality. Since π j (s strict for any such j by assumption, inequality (7) implies that there exists an object a ∈ O such that
In the former case, ϕ is manipulable by N = {j k , j} at (s 
Since ϕ satisfies group ex post incentive compatibility and π k+1 is a strict preference profile, this implies ϕ(s(l)) = ϕ(s(l + 1)) for each l by an argument similar to the last part of the proof of Claim 2. Thus ϕ(s(0)) = ϕ(s(l)), completing the proof.
To complete the proof of the Theorem, observe that Claims 2 and 3 imply that ϕ(s 
Relations (9)-(11) imply ϕ(s) = ϕ(ŝ).
Consider now a signal profile s on the boundary, i.e. s ∈ S\int(S), that is associated with strict preference π(s). Choose any i for whom s i ∈ S i \int(S i ).
Claim 4. There exists a signal profiles such thats i ∈ int(S i ),s −i = s −i , and π(s) = π(s).
Proof. Letŝ be a signal such thatŝ i ∈ int(S i ) andŝ −i = s −i . Because S i is a convex set, the agents' utility functions are continuous, and π(s) is a strict preference profile, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such thats := λŝ + (1 − λ)s is in S and π(s) = π(s). Note that
by definition ofs. To show thats i ∈ int(S i ), first note that there exists ε > 0 such that, for anys i ∈ R m i , s i −ŝ i < ε ⇒s i ∈ S i becauseŝ i ∈ int(S i ) by assumption.
This fact and convexity of S i imply that there exists ε > 0 such that, for anys i ∈ R m i , s i −s i < ε ⇒s i ∈ S i . 39 This means thats i ∈ int(S i ), completing the proof.
Lets be a signal profiles such thats i ∈ int(S i ),s −i = s −i , and π(s) = π(s): such a signals exists by Claim 4. Then, a proof similar to that in Claim 1 above can be used to show ϕ(s) = ϕ(s). Repeating this argument for each i whose signal s i is on the boundary, we can establish that ϕ(s) = ϕ(s) = · · · = ϕ(ŝ) for someŝ ∈ int(S), which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. We only need to check that condition (2) Claim 6. There exists a step-wise path of the required form connecting s andŝ.
Proof. By Claim 5, there exists a continuous path σ(t) with σ(0) = s and σ(1) =ŝ such that σ crosses at most one agent's indifference surface at a given t, only for finitely many t's: 0 < t 1 < ... < t K−1 < 1 for some positive integer K. Let t 0 ≡ 0 and t K ≡ 1. Let agent i k ∈ N be indifferent over at least a pair of objects at t k , 0 < k < K, and let π k be such that σ(t) ∈ S π k for all t ∈ (t k−1 , t k ). Then, since the specified utility function satisfies the Interdependence assumption, for such k there exists j k = i k such that s k− ≡ σ(t k ) − εe j k ∈ S π k and s k+ ≡ σ(t k ) + εe j k ∈ S π k+1 for a (positive or negative) real number ε with a sufficiently small absolute value, where e j is a vector whose component corresponding to j equals one and all other components equal zero. For ε with any sufficiently small absolute value, any signal on the line segment between s k− and s k+ gives rise to the same strict preference for all agents, except for agent i k whose preferences change from π Piecing togetherσ k with the line segment s k− s k+ , for each k = 1, ..., K − 1 and finally connecting withσ K , we construct a step-wise path of the required form.
The above claims prove Proposition 1.
